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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REJECTING THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE:
SILENCE ABOUT DEPORTATION MAY OR MAY NOT VIOLATE
STRICKLAND’S PERFORMANCE PRONG

INTRODUCTION
Every fall, it happens in America. A college freshman, on his own for the
first time, busts “the dope moves;” he “bust[s] the stupid moves.”1 And he is
busted with a thirty-five gram bag of marijuana.
The state charges this student with class A misdemeanor possession of
marijuana.2 If convicted, his sentence could be a year in prison.3 To avoid
prison time, his attorney works out a deal: he pleads guilty and in exchange
receives a suspended imposition of sentence and one year of probation.4
Before accepting the plea, the court runs through its normal questions to ensure
that his plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligently made as required by the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.5
After this young man completes his probation, the court then terminates
the case pursuant to a rehabilitative statute.6 For most, the matter would be
closed. But this young man’s attorney busted some really stupid moves.
Although she knew her client was a Canadian citizen and a U.S. Lawful
Permanent Resident (LPR)7 alien, she never bothered to check or advise her
client about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Her client will
now certainly be removed; he just pled guilty to a deportable offense.8
1. FRESH (Miramax Films 1994). During the last five years for which statistics are
available, more than one-third of college students reported having used marijuana in the last year.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drug Use, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/
du.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
2. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 195.202.3 (2000).
3. See, e.g., id. § 558.011.1(5) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
4. § 195.017.2(4)(u)(2000 & Supp. 2005); § 195.202.2–3 (2000). Instead of sentencing a
defendant, a court may suspend the sentence and place the accused on probation. § 557.011.2(3)
(2000).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 610.105 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
7. A “green card” holder. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Green Card
(LPR), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (Follow “Permanent Residence (green card)”
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000). Throughout this note, “deportation” and “removal”
are used interchangeably. Most people are more familiar with the term “deportation
proceedings,” but the correct term is “removal proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2000).
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Aliens who unknowingly pled guilty to deportable offenses have generally
pursued two lines of attack. Some attempt to withdraw their guilty pleas by
asserting that due process required the trial court to question and inform them
about the immigration consequences of the pleas.9 Others challenge their
convictions by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.10
The first line of attack has always failed—no jurisdiction has ever held that
trial courts must inform defendants about any “collateral consequences” of
their pleas, including deportation.11 Similarly, in most jurisdictions, an
attorney’s failure to advise her client is not a cognizable claim either.12 Only
one jurisdiction, New Mexico, has departed from this line of reasoning and
concluded that an attorney’s failure to advise an alien defendant of the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea may violate his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel.13
Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court disentangled the collateral
consequences doctrine’s due process origins from the Sixth Amendment
analysis.14 In State v. Paredez, the court determined that deportation continues
to be a collateral consequence of conviction that trial courts need not address.15
According to New Mexico’s high court, however, a collateral consequence
exception to ineffective assistance of counsel claims is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent.16 Ironically, the court failed to follow that same
precedent when it announced the bright-line rule that an attorney’s failure to
advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is
categorically unreasonable.17 Instead, the New Mexico Supreme Court should
have found that an attorney acts unreasonably when she does not inform her
client about immigration consequences that might influence his decision to
plead guilty or go to trial.
This Comment first explains the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.
Part II discusses the due process requirement that a plea be voluntary and
intelligent and the emergence of the collateral consequences doctrine as an
exception to that rule. Part III then examines the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement that all criminal defendants be provided with effective assistance

9. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242−43 (1969) (noting that courts should make
sure the accused fully understands the consequences of a plea).
10. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53, 58 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 671, 687 (1984).
11. See infra notes 40−52 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70−76 and accompanying text.
13. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).
14. Id. at 803–04.
15. Id. at 803.
16. Id. at 804.
17. Id.
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of counsel, observing that many courts apply the collateral consequences
doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but several include
exceptions for misadvice or equivocal advice. Part IV describes State v.
Paredez, which evaluates the collateral consequences doctrine in both the due
process and ineffective assistance of counsel contexts. Part V asserts that New
Mexico correctly determined that deportation follows criminal conviction as a
collateral, rather than direct, consequence. The Comment then argues that
courts, including the New Mexico Supreme Court, have illegitimately replaced
Strickland’s case-by-case reasonableness analysis with bright-line rules. The
author then proposes a workable standard and evaluates three scenarios facing
criminal defendants using that standard.
I. THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS
More than twenty million aliens live in the United States.18 While the
overwhelming majority of aliens are law-abiding members of society, tens of
thousands brush with the law each year. As a result, the government currently
removes (deports) almost ninety thousand “criminal aliens” a year.19 Over
eighty thousand of them plead guilty to deportable offenses.20
From 1984 to 2002, the number of deportations for criminal convictions
increased seventy-one times.21 This rapid increase is due, in part, to draconian
18. As of 2003, the government estimated that 11.5 million Lawful Permanent Residents
resided in the United States. NANCY F. RYTINA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION AND
POPULATION ELIGIBLE TO NATURALIZE IN 2003 3 (Jan. 2005), available at http://uscis.gov/
graphics/shared/statistics/publications/EstimateLPR2003.pdf. The government estimates that an
additional seven million aliens resided in the United States illegally. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000 1 (2003), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf. The U.S. Census
Bureau estimates that an additional 500,000 illegal immigrants enter the country each year.
Center for Immigration Studies, Current Numbers, http://www.cis.org/topics/current
numbers.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
19. MARY DOUGHERTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004 1 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf.
20. In 2002, ninety-five percent of criminal convictions in state courts were obtained through
guilty pleas. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf. In federal court during 2003, ninety-six percent of convictions resulted from
guilty pleas. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2, 59 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
cfjs03.pdf.
21. Anne M. Gallagher, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Primer on
What Crimes Can Get Your Client Into Trouble, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW
HANDBOOK 166, 166 (2004–2005).
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changes in the immigration laws. The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)22 and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)23 greatly expanded the list of
deportable offenses.24 Crimes of moral turpitude,25 aggravated felonies,26
certain firearm offenses,27 and crimes of domestic violence28 are among the
offenses that warrant deportation. Conviction for all drug crimes,29 except
possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana,30 also results in an alien’s
removal, even if he has been a lawful resident of the United States since
infancy.31
At the same time AEDPA and IIRIRA broadened the class of deportable
crimes, the laws eliminated all discretion that immigration judges previously
had to waive deportation for many offenses; removal now follows as a matter
of course.32 An alien may only prevent removal by vacating his conviction
based on a procedural or substantive flaw in the underlying proceedings.33
Convictions vacated on ameliorative (i.e., to avoid deportation) or
rehabilitative (i.e., probation completed) grounds remain “convictions” for
immigration purposes and therefore continue to warrant deportation.34
22. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
23. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
24. Gallagher, supra note 21, at 166.
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2000). A crime of moral turpitude involves “conduct
which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality.”
Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994), aff’d 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995). Such
crimes include aggravated assault, child abuse, rape, statutory rape, arson, fraud, receipt of stolen
property, and bribery. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 52−57
(8th ed. 2002).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). Aggravated felonies include murder, rape or
sexual abuse of a minor, trafficking in controlled substances, offenses relating to explosives and
firearms, theft or burglary offenses in which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one
year, fraud or deceit in which the victim’s loss exceeds $10,000, and crimes of violence for which
the term of imprisonment imposed, regardless of any suspension of sentence, is at least one year.
§ 1101(a)(43)(A)–(G); KURZBAN, supra note 25, at 122−33.
27. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
28. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
29. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
30. Id.
31. Rob A. Justman, Comment, The Effects of AEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation Consequences of
Pleading Guilty to an “Aggravated Felony”, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701, 731 (2004).
32. See id. at 701–08 (discussing how AEDPA and IIRIRA eliminated discretionary relief
for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act). Under pre-AEDPA law, aliens convicted of drug offenses were also eligible for
a discretionary waiver of deportation. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001).
33. In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003).
34. Mark T. Kenmore, Getting Comfortable with Post-Conviction Relief, in IMMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 197, 202 (2004). A narrow exception exists for aliens placed
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II. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT A GUILTY PLEA BE VOLUNTARY, KNOWING,
AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE
Due process35 requires trial courts to explain certain consequences of
criminal convictions to the defendant and ensure that all pleas are entered
voluntarily.36 This is necessary because when a defendant pleads guilty, he
waives several constitutional rights.37 For a waiver of these rights to be
constitutionally valid, the waiver must be “an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”38 Therefore, the waiver must be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.39
A.

The Development of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine

A waiver qualifies as voluntary, knowing, and intelligent only if it was
made “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

into immigration proceedings in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 200; see also Lujan-Armendariz v.
I.N.S., 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that first-time drug offenders who take advantage of
state rehabilitative schemes and would otherwise be eligible for relief under the Federal First
Offender Act are not “convicted” for purposes of deportation). The Board of Immigration
Appeals and each other circuit to address the issue have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
See, e.g., Resendiz-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004); Acosta v.
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Salazar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 235 (BIA 2002).
35. The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment
states that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
36. See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (vacating defendant’s
conviction because the trial judge did not question the defendant as to the voluntary nature of his
plea). In McCarthy, the Court based its decision on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and explained that those rules exist to protect the defendant’s due process rights.
Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal
Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 166 (1981); Guy Cohen, Note, Weakness of the
Collateral Consequences Doctrine: Counsel’s Duty to Inform Aliens of the Deportation
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1094, 1105 (1993); see also Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (reversing defendant’s conviction because the record contained no
evidence that defendant intelligently and knowingly pled guilty).
37. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. By admitting guilt, the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment
right against compulsory self incrimination. Id. This Fifth Amendment right applies to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The defendant also
waives his Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury and to confront his accusers. Boykin,
395 U.S. at 243. Trial by jury and the right to confront the witnesses against the defendant are so
fundamental to the American system of justice that the Fourteenth Amendment protects these
rights in state courts. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965).
38. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
39. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b) (2005); Budeiri, supra note 36, at 165–66; Cohen, supra note 36, at 1105–06.
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consequences.”40 Not every circumstance or consequence appears to be
relevant—the Supreme Court stated that a defendant must be “fully aware of
the direct consequences” of his plea.41 Most courts have interpreted this
language to mean that the defendant need know only the “direct” consequences
of his plea; he need not know about any “collateral” consequences.42
Direct consequences have “a definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”43 Consequences affecting
the maximum term of imprisonment, such as when a sentence commences and
ineligibility for parole or mandatory special parole terms, are deemed
“direct.”44 Unlike direct consequences, “collateral” consequences remain
“beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in which [the]
conviction was entered.”45 Collateral consequences are not necessarily minor
consequences. They include loss of the right to obtain a passport, to serve on a
jury, loss of business licenses, deportation, and civil commitment.46
Frequently, collateral consequences result in more significant hardship than
direct consequences.47 For example, most people would probably consider
certain collateral consequences such as indefinite civil commitment48 or
permanent removal from the United States49 to be more severe than a short
prison sentence.

40. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
41. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (rev’d
on confession of error on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)) (emphasis added); Gabriel J. Chin &
Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 728 (2002).
42. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 728; see, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918,
922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curium) (It is “well settled that, before pleading, the defendant need not
be advised of all collateral consequences of his plea.”); Johnson v. United States, 460 F.2d 1203,
1204 (9th Cir. 1972) (“We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the
word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.”); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent
Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365 (4th Cir. 1973).
43. United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Torrey v.
Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1988)).
44. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 181–86.
45. See, e.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)); accord State v. Aquino, 873 A.2d 1075,
1082 (Conn. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004).
46. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 170–77. For an exhaustive list of collateral consequences, see
Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 705–06.
47. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 699–700; Steve Colella, “Guilty, Your Honor”: The
Direct and Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas and the Courts that Inconsistently Interpret
Them, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 305, 309 (2004).
48. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362−63 (1997); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475
F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
49. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 171; Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 705–06.
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Despite deportation’s severity, each federal circuit court to consider the
issue has found it a collateral, rather than direct, consequence of a guilty plea.50
The federal circuits that have not yet directly considered the issue generally
indicate that they too would reach the same holding.51 Similarly, state courts
have reached the same conclusion.52
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that in
all criminal trials, “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.”53 Although initially it only applied to federal
trials,54 the Sixth Amendment right to counsel now also attaches to state
prosecutions.55 The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to
representation during critical stages of a criminal prosecution,56 it also
guarantees “effective assistance of counsel.”57
Actions taken by both the state and counsel may deprive a criminal
defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The government violates
this right when it interferes with the attorney’s ability to conduct the defense or
independent decision-making.58 An attorney deprives her clients of their Sixth
Amendment rights when she fails to provide “adequate legal assistance.”59
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court introduced a two-prong
test to determine if an attorney’s assistance of counsel was so defective that a
Sixth Amendment violation occurred.60 First, the defendant must show that his
attorney’s performance fell below that of an objectively reasonably competent
50. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 803.
51. Id.; see, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004); Kandiel v.
United States, 964 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992). But see United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179,
190–91 (2d Cir. 2002) (indicating that arguments that deportation is no longer collateral in light
of the fact that changes in the immigration laws are “persuasive”).
52. Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587, at *2 n.5 (Va. Cir.
Ct. July 26, 2005).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court considers assistance of counsel as a
safeguard “necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
54. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
56. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
57. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).
58. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
59. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980). For example, a conflict of interest
between the attorney and her client could so adversely affect the adequacy of counsel’s
representation as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 359; Wood v. Georgia, 450
U.S. 261, 272–74 (1981).
60. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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attorney considering all the circumstances.61 When evaluating reasonableness,
standards reflected by professional organizations and bar associations are
probative but not dispositive.62 The Court explained that “no particular set of
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.”63 Although counsel
enjoys a strong presumption that her behavior is reasonable, a defendant can
overcome this presumption.64
If the defendant can establish that his attorney’s representation was
objectively unreasonable, he must then establish that his attorney’s deficient
performance prejudiced him in some way.65 To establish prejudice, the
defendant must prove that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”66
The Strickland test also applies when a defendant alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel after a guilty plea.67 In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court
explained that the defendant must first “attack the voluntary and intelligent
character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from
counsel” was objectively unreasonable.68 Then to establish prejudice, “the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.”69
A.

Application of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine to Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel

Most courts extend the collateral consequences doctrine (relating to the
trial court’s duty to inform a defendant about the consequences of his plea) to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.70 In most jurisdictions, an attorney’s
failure to advise her client about the collateral consequences of a guilty plea
cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.71 Those jurisdictions hold

61. Id. at 687–88. The reasonableness of the attorney is based on an objective standard. Id.
62. Id. at 688.
63. Id. at 688−89.
64. Id. at 688.
65. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 692.
66. Id. at 694. Prejudice is presumed in certain circumstances such as “[a]ctual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 692.
67. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
68. Id. at 56–57.
69. Id. at 59.
70. Cohen, supra note 36, at 1109.
71. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 703–04; Cohen, supra note 36, at 1109. Professors
Chin and Holmes state “all courts.” Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 703–04. Paredez creates
an exception to this rule. See infra notes 105–128.
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that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to explain only the direct
consequences of a guilty plea.72
B.

Ineffective Assistance and Advice Regarding Immigration Consequences

Deportation is possibly the harshest consequence of a guilty plea.73 It may
cause “loss of both property or life, or of all that makes life worth living.”74 In
many cases, the immigration consequence of a guilty plea—deportation—far
outweighs the criminal consequences.75 For example, in the scenario in the
introduction, the youth would serve no jail time but would be separated from
his family and friends with no way back, ever.
Despite the severity of deportation, the majority of courts apply the
collateral consequences doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
where the attorney failed to advise her alien client about the risk of deportation
upon entering a guilty plea.76 Only New Mexico recognizes that an attorney’s
silence may violate the Sixth Amendment.77 Several jurisdictions do, however,
recognize that immigration consequences may form part of the bargain.
1.

The Misadvice Exception

In some jurisdictions, attorneys are not completely relieved from all
obligations regarding the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.78 The
courts that adopt the “middle ground” find ineffective assistance of counsel
when attorneys misadvise their clients, leading them to believe that deportation
will not follow.79 In these jurisdictions, defense attorneys have no affirmative
obligation to advise defendants that a plea will result in deportation, but
advice, if offered, must be accurate.80

72. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 703.
73. Justman, supra note 31, at 732.
74. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
75. Jennifer Welch, Comment, Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public Defenders
to Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CAL. L. Rev. 541, 545 (2004).
76. Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 89 CAL. L. Rev. 741, 751 (2001); see, e.g., United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d
354 (5th Cir. 1993); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Del
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th
Cir. 1985); Nikolaev v. Webber, 705 N.W.2d 72 (S.D. 2005); State v. Santos, 401 N.W.2d 856
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
77. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).
78. John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 691, 724–25 (2003).
79. McDermid, supra note 76, at 754.
80. Francis, supra note 78, at 726; see, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187–88
(2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1985);
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This distinction between nonadvice and affirmative misadvice is
problematic because ineffective assistance of counsel claims can only be
brought with respect to proceedings that are covered by the right to counsel,
and the courts that adopt the collateral consequence doctrine consider
deportation outside the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel.81 One
possible explanation is that courts might justify the distinction on practical
considerations because it is “easier to prove that misadvice, rather than nonadvice” caused the alien to plead guilty.82
2.

The “Maybe” Exception

Recently, a few jurisdictions have recognized a second exception to the
“no obligation” rule.83 In the “maybe” exception group, an attorney’s
performance is objectively unreasonable when she tells her client that a
possibility of deportation exists but, in fact, deportation is a certainty.84 For
example, the Ninth Circuit found defense counsel’s performance to have been
deficient when he informed the defendant that deportation was “technically a
possibility,” but “not a serious possibility.”85 Likewise, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has held that when deportation will “almost certainly” follow
as a consequence of a guilty plea, counsel’s advice that the plea “could” result
in deportation was “misleading and thus deficient.”86
IV. A NEW BRIGHT-LINE: STATE V. PAREDEZ
In State v. Paredez,87 the New Mexico Supreme Court disentangled
ineffective assistance of counsel from the collateral consequences doctrine.88
In doing so, Paredez broke ground as the first case in which an attorney’s

Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 26,
2005); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004).
81. Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 735.
82. Id. at 736. This author suggests that the only possible reasonable justification for this
distinction could be that counsel is required as a “special circumstance” under the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)
(concluding that due process requires appointing counsel at some parole and probation revocation
hearings).
83. Some jurisdictions have rejected the “maybe” exception. For example, in State v. RojasMartinez, advice that pleading guilty to an aggravated felony “might or might not” lead to
deportation did not qualify as misadvice. 125 P.3d 930, 933 (Utah 2005); see also Gonzalez v.
State, 134 P.3d 955 (Or. 2006) (holding that counsel is required to advise alien clients that a
criminal conviction could result in deportation).
84. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 934.
85. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005).
86. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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failure to advise her client about the immigration consequences of a plea
violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to effective assistance of counsel.89
A.

Background

Ramon Paredez pled guilty to criminal sexual contact of a minor on a child
thirteen to eighteen years of age.90 At the plea hearing, the defendant’s
attorney informed the court that the defendant was a Guatemalan citizen and
lawful permanent resident alien.91 His attorney also told the court that he had
advised the defendant that the plea “could” have immigration consequences.92
The district court then informed the defendant that his plea “could” affect his
immigration status.93 The court sentenced the defendant to three years, but
suspended the sentence and placed the defendant on probation for three
years.94 Immediately thereafter, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea because he had not been fully informed of the immigration consequences
of his plea.95 The district court denied the defendant’s motion, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court was not “required to
provide a more specific explanation of the immigration consequences of the
defendant’s guilty plea” and that the record was “insufficient to address on
direct appeal the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”96
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court first noted that the defendant
“almost certainly will be deported back to Guatemala” as an aggravated felon
without any opportunity for discretionary relief.97 The court observed that
neither the district court nor defense counsel informed him that his plea would
result in “virtually automatic deportation.”98
B.

The Court’s Duty to Inform a Criminal Defendant of the Immigration
Consequences of a Guilty Plea

In Paredez, the court first examined the trial court’s duty to inform
criminal defendants about the immigration consequences of their guilty pleas.99
The court concluded that the district court complied with the state’s rules of

89. Id. at 803–04.
90. Id. at 800–01.
91. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 801.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 801.
97. Id. “Aggravated felon” is the term used for an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
See Justman, supra note 31, at 704.
98. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 801.
99. Id. at 802.
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criminal procedure100 when it told the defendant that his plea “could” result in
his deportation.101 The court then considered whether the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution required the district court to specifically inform the
defendant that his plea would result in his deportation rather than that it could
result in his deportation.102
Noting the Boykin and Brady standards that a plea must be voluntary,
knowing, and intelligently made, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed
that the trial court has a duty only to ensure that a criminal defendant
comprehends the “direct” consequences of his guilty plea; it has no duty to
inform him of the “collateral” consequences.103 Citing the First Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Gonzalez,104 the court explained:
What renders [a] plea’s immigration effects “collateral” is not that they arise
“virtually by operation of law,” but the fact that deportation is “not the
sentence of the court which accept[s] the plea but of another agency over
which the trial judge has no control and for which he [or she] has no
105
responsibility.

The court explained that although changes in immigration law made
deportation virtually automatic rather than merely possible, it continues to
follow as a collateral consequence.106 The court concluded that because due
process does not require that the trial court inform the defendant about
collateral consequences, due process did not require the trial court to inform
the defendant that his plea “almost certainly” would result in his deportation.107
C. An Attorney’s Duty to Inform Clients of the Immigration Consequences of
a Guilty Plea
The court’s decision in Paredez that due process imposed no duty on the
trial court did not necessarily mean that the Sixth Amendment similarly
imposed no duty on counsel.108 The court proceeded to analyze whether
defense counsel’s failure to inform the defendant that his plea would “almost
certainly” result in his deportation constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.109
100. N.M. RULES ANN. 5-303 (2004).
101. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 802–03.
102. Id. at 803. The court declined to consider an argument based on the due process clause
of the New Mexico constitution because Paredez did not argue that the state due process clause
should be interpreted differently than the federal due process clause. Id. at 802.
103. Id. at 802–03.
104. United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000).
105. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 803 (citing Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27 (citation omitted)).
106. Id. at 803.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 803–04.
109. Id. at 804.
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After outlining the Strickland two-part test, the court first addressed the
deficient performance prong.110 The court agreed with the jurisdictions that
recognize “affirmative misrepresentation[s]” as objectively unreasonable.111
Further, if deportation is almost certain, an attorney’s advice that he “could” or
“might” be deported misleads the client into believing he possesses some
chance of remaining in the United States.112 Therefore, such statements also
fall below objective standards of reasonableness.113 Instead of merely adopting
the “maybe” exception, the court went “one step further” and announced a new
bright-line rule: “an attorney’s non-advice to an alien defendant on the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea would also be deficient
performance.”114
The court acknowledged and rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Broomes v. Ashcroft115 that defense counsel’s failure to advise a criminal
defendant about the possibility of deportation cannot be ineffective assistance
of counsel because deportation remains a collateral consequence of
conviction.116 The New Mexico Supreme Court rested its decision on three
grounds. First, the court found a tenuous distinction between nonadvice and
misadvice.117 Misadvice that a guilty plea “might,” “may,” or “could” result in
deportation and nonadvice regarding the immigration consequences both result
in a defendant deciding whether to plead guilty without sufficient information
to make an informed decision.118 Second, citing Professor John Francis’s
article,119 the court observed that distinguishing between nonadvice and
misadvice would “create a chilling effect on the attorney’s decision to offer
advice.”120 Attorneys would risk being deemed “ineffective” if they chose to
advise their clients at all.121 Finally, the court recognized that not requiring
lawyers to advise their clients of the specific immigration consequences of
their guilty pleas will shift the burden “to discern complex legal issues on a
class of clients least able to handle that duty.”122 As additional support, the
court described the American Bar Association standards for criminal defense

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803–04.
Id. at 804.
358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004).
Paredez, 101 P.3d at 804.
Id.
Id. at 804–05.
Francis, supra note 78.
Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805.
Id. at 805.
Id. (quoting Francis, supra note 78, at 726).
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attorneys123 and determined that attorneys offer deficient performance unless
they: 1) “determine the immigration status of their clients;” and 2) advise them
“of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty.”124
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant
must also satisfy the Strickland “prejudice” prong.125 In Paredez, the
defendant needed to show that he would not have pled guilty had he been
“given constitutionally adequate advice” about the immigration consequences
of his plea.126 Although the court found a “strong inference” that the defendant
would not have pled guilty had his attorney properly advised him, the court
found the record insufficiently developed to make that determination.127 The
court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.128
V. PAREDEZ REACHED THE RIGHT RESULT, BUT ANNOUNCED THE WRONG
RULE
New Mexico’s Paredez decision is likely to draw criticism from all sides.
Immigrant advocates may criticize the Paredez decision because courts have
no duty to inform defendants about the immigration consequences of their
guilty pleas. Anti-immigrant groups may criticize it because it means a court’s
non-duty does not relieve attorneys from their own independent duties.
A.

Deportation is a Collateral Consequence

The Paredez decision correctly applied the Supreme Court’s rule that due
process requires that a defendant know the “direct” consequence of his plea.129
Courts should not have to be aware of every possible consequence, and even
though deportation ranks among the most draconian punishments, it still
remains outside the scope of criminal proceedings.
Several authors have criticized the collateral consequences doctrine’s
application to deportation because, post-IIRIRA, deportation follows
conviction as a matter of course.130 These arguments assert that even if
deportation were a collateral consequence prior to 1996, IIRIRA and AEDPA
so greatly changed the nature of deportation proceedings that it is no longer

123. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, standard § 14-3.2 (3d ed.
1999).
124. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805.
125. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687−88 (1984).
126. Paredez, 101 P.3d at 805 (citing Gonzalez v. Oregon, 83 P.3d 921, 925 (2004)).
127. Id. at 805–06.
128. Id. at 806.
129. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
130. Melissa L. Castillo, Comment, A Duty to Warn: Representing the Non-Citizen in a
Criminal Case [State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002)], 44 WASHBURN L.J. 627, 649–51
(2005); Colella, supra note 47, at 323; McDermid, supra note 76, at 762.
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collateral.131 Because immigration judges no longer have discretion to suspend
or cancel removal proceedings, some argue that deportation follows as an
automatic, immediate and definite consequence of a guilty plea—that
deportation is a direct consequence.132
There is no doubt that the 1996 laws moved deportation from a possible
consequence to a certain or definite consequence. The Supreme Court
recognized this in Immigration and Naturalization Services v. St. Cyr.133
However, St. Cyr does not support arguments that the definite or certain nature
of deportation moved it into the “direct” category. While the Court noted the
“clear difference . . . between facing possible deportation and facing certain
deportation,” the Court identified the distinction “for the purposes of
retroactivity analysis,” and made no mention of the direct-collateral
distinction.134
While deportation is a definite result of a guilty plea, it is neither automatic
nor immediate. “Automatic” consequences require no further action from any
government agent.135 For example, ineligibility for welfare benefits qualifies
as automatic because the government need not take any action to suspend or
An alien’s removal does not
deny an individual those benefits.136
automatically follow a criminal conviction. Instead, the alien must be issued a
Notice to Appear,137 placed in removal proceedings,138 and ordered removed
by an immigration judge.139
After pleading guilty to a removable offense, deportation is a near
certainty,140 but it does not necessarily follow immediately. United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents have the power to issue
detainers to other law enforcement agencies for the purpose of holding and
arresting criminal aliens.141 In many cases, years pass between the entry of a
guilty plea and the initiation of removal proceedings.142
131. Castillo, supra note 130, at 649–50; Colella, supra note 47, at 323; McDermid, supra,
note 76, at 762.
132. Castillo, supra note 130, at 649–50; Colella, supra note 47, at 323; McDermid, supra,
note 76, at 762.
133. 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001).
134. Id.
135. United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000).
136. United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2000).
137. The Notice to Appear is the immigration charging document. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2000).
138. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2006).
139. § 1240.12(c).
140. See supra notes 22−34 and accompanying text.
141. § 287.2. A “detainer” requests that an agency hold an alien until the Department of
Homeland Security can assume custody. Id.
142. See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2005) (over two years
between plea and initiation of proceedings); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1108−09 (9th
Cir. 2005) (over three years between plea and initiation of proceedings); United States v. Fry, 322
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Even assuming these arguments were correct as to the automatic and
immediate nature of deportation, they overlook the nature of the directcollateral distinction. As the court in Paredez pointed out, the direct-collateral
distinction rests not on whether the effect occurs “virtually by operation of
law,” but instead on whether the issuing court has control over the
consequence in question.143 The First,144 Sixth,145 Ninth,146 and Tenth147
Circuits, as well as several state courts,148 have reiterated that regardless of
how automatic a consequence, if it “remains beyond the control and
responsibility” of the sentencing court, it “remains a collateral
consequence.”149 As the Ninth Circuit explained, “no matter what changes
have been wrought by AEDPA and IIRIRA, removal remains the result of
another governmental agency’s subsequent actions.”150
B.

Failure to Advise of the Immigration Consequences of a Guilty Plea May
Be Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

When evaluating whether Mr. Paredez’s attorney provided ineffective
assistance, the New Mexico Supreme Court properly focused on whether his
counsel’s conduct was objectively reasonable rather than whether deportation
is collateral or direct. Yet the court adopted another bright-line rule: an
attorney’s silence about the possibility of deportation is categorically
unreasonable. Like the direct-collateral distinction, this rule is inconsistent
with Strickland’s case-by-case approach to evaluating ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Instead, the court should have adopted a uniform standard that
satisfies Strickland and yields the proper result in the nonadvice, misadvice,
and equivocal advice categories.

F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). In other cases, the delay is several months. See, e.g., ElNobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (three months).
143. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (quoting U.S. v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20,
27 (1st Cir. 2000)).
144. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27.
145. El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421.
146. United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 515–16 (9th Cir. 2002).
147. Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004).
148. See, e.g., Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 403 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); State v.
Abdullahi, 607 N.W.2d 561, 567 (N.D. 2000).
149. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27. But cf. United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 190 (2nd Cir.
2002) (finding arguments that deportation is no longer collateral “persuasive” and deserving of
“careful consideration”).
150. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d at 516.
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The Collateral Consequences Doctrine Cannot Exist Outside of
Strickland

Many critics correctly identify the collateral consequences doctrine as
inconsistent with Strickland.151 In the two decades since the Supreme Court
decided Strickland152 and Hill,153 the Court has heard many ineffective
assistance claims. The Supreme Court has never distinguished between
collateral and direct consequences when evaluating those claims.154 In fact, in
Hill, the Court declined to adopt the Eighth Circuit’s direct-collateral
distinction and instead reiterated that the Strickland test applies to all
ineffective assistance claims.155 In Hill, the Supreme Court did not affirm the
Eighth Circuit’s decision on the basis of the direct-collateral distinction, as
announced by the Court of Appeals, but rather because petitioner Hill failed to
satisfy the Strickland test, which also applies to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims relating to guilty pleas.156
Unlike other areas, such as administrative law or dormant commerce
clause analysis where different tests exist for different situations,157 the
Supreme Court applies only the Strickland test to determine whether an
attorney provided ineffective assistance following both trials and guilty
pleas.158 While the Court has, at times, indicated that certain attorney acts or
omissions are professionally unreasonable,159 Strickland requires a
151. Some criticize the use of the doctrine in general. See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 130, at
653; Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 709–12; Cohen, supra note 36, at 1135–36, 1143–45.
Others criticize only its application in immigration cases. See, e.g., Francis, supra note 78, at
725–29; Justman, supra note 31, at 731–32, 734–36; McDermid, supra note 76, at 763.
152. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
153. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
154. The Court only mentions “collateral consequences” in two decisions; neither decision
discusses an attorney’s obligations relating to collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972).
155. 474 U.S. 52, 55, 58 (1985). The Eighth Circuit rejected Mr. Hill’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, in part because parole eligibility is a “collateral rather than direct
consequence . . . of which a defendant need not be informed.” Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568,
570 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 764 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
156. Hill, 474 U.S. at 55, 58.
157. Certain administrative actions receive deference under the standard announced in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), while
others deserve deference under the standard explained in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944). United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226−27 (2001). When evaluating dormant
commerce clause issues, the Supreme Court applies a strict-scrutiny test for discriminatory laws
and the Pike balancing test to nondiscriminatory statutes. NORMAN REDLICH ET. AL,
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191, 200−04 (2005). Special thanks to Professor
Frederic Bloom for helping the author with this analogy.
158. Hill, 474 U.S. at 52, 57 (1985).
159. E.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (where the attorney disregarded
specific instructions to file notice of appeal).
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“circumstance-specific” inquiry.160 Per se bright-line rules are inconsistent
with Strickland.161 Instead, courts must determine the reasonableness of an
attorney’s conduct in light of the circumstances of the particular case at the
time of the act or omission.162
2.

Is Attorney Silence Categorically Reasonable?

The collateral consequences doctrine illegitimately replaces the case-bycase analysis required under Strickland’s performance prong. This bright-line
refusal to consider collateral consequences must mean that courts find an
attorney’s silence categorically reasonable.163 Some collateral consequences
may be reasonably excluded from defense counsel’s radar because a
reasonably competent attorney need not be aware of every possible
consequence of a guilty plea.164 Others, however, are of such overriding
importance that they cannot reasonably be ignored.
a.

Silence About Restraints on Liberty Can Be Unreasonable

The Supreme Court has attached special significance to consequences that
result in restraints on liberty.165 This significance is not limited to only some
restraints on liberty—“any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter.”166 For
example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in all criminal

160. Roe v. Lucio Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000).
161. Id.
162. Id.; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688−90 (1984).
163. For example, Utah “adopt[ed] the collateral consequence rule and the affirmative
misrepresentation exception to it” without analyzing the misrepresentation under the performance
prong of the Strickland test. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 934 (Utah 2005).
164. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee perfect advocacy; it guarantees only
reasonable competence judged according to “prevailing professional norms.” Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. For example, a reasonably competent
defense counsel might not be aware that a conviction might result in the loss of her client’s
business license. Budeiri, supra note 36, at 171. Furthermore, some collateral consequences,
such as disenfranchisement, vary by jurisdiction. In thirty-six states, convicted felons are
disenfranchised while on parole or probation; eleven states permit lifetime disenfranchisement.
The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
issues_03.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Assigned counsel in rural areas should not be
expected to know every collateral consequence. In nearly half of the states, assigned counsel,
rather than the Public Defender, represent indigent defendants at criminal trial. U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, NAT’L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS, app. 6 (1999). Overall,
more than half of the counties nationwide rely on the assigned counsel model. Id. at 19. For a
list of collateral consequences, see Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 705−06.
165. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972).
166. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373−74 (1979) (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 41
(Burger, C.J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
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proceedings,167 yet an indigent defendant has the right to appointed counsel
only when “the accused is deprived of his liberty.”168 In Argersinger v.
Hamlin, the Supreme Court described the needs of indigent defendants when
they plead guilty:
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem
which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is
needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is
169
fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison.

An attorney performs in an objectively unreasonable manner when she
fails to inform her client about restraints on liberty that are penal in nature, be
they collateral or direct.170 While deportation is collateral in the sense that it
remains outside the sentencing court’s control or responsibility,171 the
possibility of deportation remains part of the bargain. In Argersinger, the
Court underscored that counsel is necessary for the defendant to be “fully
aware” of the prospect of prison or jail time.172 Although deportation is not
167. U.S. CONST. amend VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
168. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32. The right to appointed counsel attaches only when the
defendant has actually been sentenced to imprisonment, and not when fines or other punishment
are imposed. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373−74.
169. 407 U.S. at 34.
170. Of the numerous collateral consequences, the author believes that only civil commitment
and deportation constitute significant restraints on liberty. The Court considers civil commitment
to be non-punitive because it does not implicate retribution or deterrence. Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 361−62 (1997). Although the Supreme Court has never held that deportation is
penal in nature, the author believes it has a more penal nature than civil commitment because it is
so severe and sufficiently similar to the criminal sanctions of banishment and transportation.
The Supreme Court uses seven factors as guideposts to evaluate whether a consequence
is penal in nature. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). Generally, a law is penal in nature
when it imposes a “disability for the purposes of punishment, . . . to reprimand the wrongdoer,
[or] to deter others.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
Among the factors is whether the law has historically been regarded as punishment.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Deportation, although not technically a criminal punishment, is the
equivalent of “banishment” or “exile,” and as such, constitutes a “penalty.” Barber v. Gonzales,
347 U.S. 637, 642 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Bridges v. Wixton,
326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269 (1905) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the view of deportation as non-penal may
be “highly fictional.” Trop, 356 U.S. at 98. It constitutes an “additional punishment” for the
same criminal conviction. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). Like denaturalization, the fact that deportation “may be imposed for purposes other
than punishment affords no basis” for saying deportation is not, in some cases, a punishment.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 98–99. For example, in addition to the criminal convictions discussed in Part I,
aliens may also be removed for their mere presence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(1)(B) (2000).
171. See supra notes 129−150 and accompanying text.
172. 407 U.S. at 34.
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actual imprisonment, the “central premise” is the same: deprivation of liberty
is different from other penalties.173 Deportation “deprives an [individual] of
the right to stay and work in this land of freedom.”174 In other words, it
restrains a person’s liberty.175
b.

The Supreme Court Hinted that Silence May Be Unreasonable

The Supreme Court has hinted that failure to advise a client regarding the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea may fall below normal levels of
attorney competence.176 The Court acknowledged “little doubt that . . . alien
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely
aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.”177 The Court
then underscored the importance by explaining that, in the immediate case,
“[e]ven if the defendant were not initially aware of [immigration law],
competent defense counsel . . . would have advised him” concerning the law’s
importance.178
c.

American Bar Association Standards Suggest Silence May Be
Unreasonable

The Strickland decision explained that in determining what is reasonable,
standards reflected by professional organizations and bar associations may act
as guides.179 Both the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for
Criminal Justice and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest that a
reasonably competent attorney would inform her client about the immigration
173. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
174. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154.
175. Id.
176. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001). Federal circuit courts have discussed
St. Cyr when deciding standards of attorney competence. United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198,
1200–01 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2002). For
example, in Couto, the Second Circuit recently noted the Supreme Court’s “broader view of
attorney responsibility” in St. Cyr. 311 F.3d at 187–88. In Couto, the court did not reconsider the
standards of attorney competence relating to failure to inform a defendant of the immigration
consequences; however, instead, it found counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable for
affirmatively misleading the defendant. Id. at 188. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its
position that a Sixth Amendment violation does not occur when counsel fails to advise a
defendant of collateral immigration consequences. Fry, 322 F.3d at 1200–01 (2003). In Fry, the
court concluded that the St. Cyr decision had no effect on the application of the collateral
consequences doctrine to ineffective assistance claims because “St. Cyr did not involve the
effectiveness of counsel’s representation.” Id. The court stated that whether or not alien
defendants “are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions,” deportation
remains collateral. Id. at 1201.
177. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322.
178. Id. at 323 n.50 (emphasis added).
179. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Strickland cautioned that these are
guides, and only guides. Id.
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consequences of a guilty plea.180 This is especially true because “the most
fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a
situation may involve.”181
The ABA Criminal Justice standards for guilty pleas state that “[t]o the
extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant,
sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral
consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”182 The
comments to the standard acknowledge that attorneys may not be able to
inform clients about every probable effect of a plea, but that many times a
client’s “greatest priority, will be the immigration consequences of a
conviction. To reflect this reality, counsel should be familiar with the basic
immigration consequences that flow from different types of guilty pleas, and
should keep this in mind in investigating law and fact and advising the
client.”183 The comments identify other serious collateral consequences, but
cite deportation as the “greatest potential difficulty” resulting from a guilty
plea.184
d.

Reasonable Attorneys Inform Clients About the Essential Terms of
the Bargain

Fundamental fairness requires that the alien know the essential terms of his
bargain.185 A plea bargain is just that—a bargain. The parties, the state and
the defendant bargain for a mutually beneficial arrangement. The state avoids
the cost of going to trial and the defendant receives a more predictable
outcome.186 For an alien defendant, the bargain may involve the immigration
consequences of the plea. An attorney cannot be said to have acted reasonably
if she failed to bargain for the most important term or, even worse, failed to
inform her client that a material term was included in the bargain. For
example, if a defendant is bargaining to remain with his family, and his
attorney works out a deal that avoids jail time but includes an additional term

180. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004) (“A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to the representation.”); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999).
181. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt 2 (2004).
182. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed.
1999).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67−68, 70 (1932).
186. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Judicial economy also encourages pleas. See Richard
Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent
Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 552–64 (1988).
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(deportation), the attorney does not act reasonably if she does not advise her
client about the material terms of the bargain.
Nothing in Supreme Court precedent suggests that an attorney’s silence
about the possibility of deportation is categorically reasonable. Instead, the
Court’s focus on the importance of counsel when liberty is at stake, its hint
about reasonableness in the St. Cyr decision, and its reliance on ABA standards
as guides all indicate that an attorney’s silence is not categorically reasonable.
Additionally, the very nature of the plea bargain suggests that silence about
certain terms may not be reasonable.
3.

Is Nonadvice, Misadvice, or Equivocal Advice Categorically
Unreasonable?

Like the jurisdictions that have made a categorical determination that
attorney silence is reasonable,187 the jurisdictions that recognize the
“misadvice” and “maybe” exceptions188 have made categorical determinations
that affirmative misadvice or equivocal advice are objectively unreasonable.
Academic scholarship has encouraged the extension of this categorical
determination to cover nonadvice as well,189 and New Mexico adopted this
standard in Paredez.190 Such an extension, however, simply replaces one
bright-line for another. Instead of a categorical determination that silence is
reasonable, silence is categorically unreasonable.
While in some circumstances, such as the example in the introduction, an
attorney’s silence is unreasonable for the reasons set forth above, in others,
defense counsel’s silence about deportation can be a “legitimate” decision
within the standard set by Strickland. Justice O’Connor explained that “[n]o
particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range
of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal

187. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 78−86 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 130, at 652 (asserting that an attorney’s failure to advise
her client of the collateral consequences “violates the competence prong of the Strickland test”);
Cohen, supra note 36, at 1134 (stating that an attorney’s failure to inform a defendant of the
immigration consequences is “objectively unreasonable”); Francis, supra note 78, at 733
(proposing that “all defense attorneys determine the citizenship of all clients and inform noncitizens of potential immigration consequences” and failure to conform would satisfy the
Strickland prejudice prong); McDermid, supra note 76, at 769 (arguing that the correct standard
to satisfy Strickland’s performance prong is that “counsel failed to investigate the immigration
status of the client or the actual immigration consequences that are likely to flow from the
conviction, or counsel did not adequately advise the client of those consequences”).
190. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

REJECTING THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE

289

defendant.”191 This leeway allows defense counsel to use her judgment about
tactical decisions and how to offer the best representation.192
4.

A Proposal for a Workable Standard

As described above, failure to advise aliens about the immigration
consequences from a guilty plea can constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. The standard adopted by New Mexico comes to the proper result in
all instances, but through the wrong methodology. The Paredez standard
suggests that an attorney always fails the performance prong when she does
not advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea,193
but the prejudice prong would catch situations where an attorney’s nonadvice
would be reasonable because deportation would not have been an “important
consideration.”194
The Paredez rule does not satisfy Strickland’s admonition that the
“performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances.”195 Instead, the standard for analyzing the
performance prong should be that if the possibility of deportation could have
played any part in a defendant’s decision to plead guilty or go to trial, an
attorney acts unreasonably when she fails to advise him. Under this standard,
an attorney would be objectively unreasonable when she fails to investigate the
immigration consequences and inform her client of the possibility of
deportation only if they would affect the decision-making process. If the
possibility of deportation would play no role in the process, the attorney would
have no obligation to inform the client of the immigration consequences.
This analysis is distinct from that in the prejudice prong, which continues
to be whether the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant would have to establish that both: 1) the possibility of deportation
would have played a role in the decision-making process; and 2) he would not
have pled guilty had he known about the immigration consequences. The
possibility of deportation could play a role in the decision to plead guilty, but
should not be the ultimate factor.
a.

The Capital Murder Scenario

Would an attorney fail the performance prong if she failed to investigate
and advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea that

191. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688−89 (1984).
192. Id. at 689.
193. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
194. Castillo, supra note 130, at 654–55; see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 41, at 737;
Francis, supra note 78, at 733; McDermid, supra note 76, at 769.
195. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
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avoids the death penalty? Under the Paredez standard, an attorney would act
unreasonably if she failed to advise her client about the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty to second degree murder to avoid the death
penalty, but the client would suffer no prejudice by his attorney’s nonadvice.
Under the author’s proposed standard, the defendant would not be able to
establish deficient performance so a court would never reach the prejudice
prong.
In this situation, the attorney’s decision not to discuss deportation is
objectively reasonable within “the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent” the defendant.196 When facing a capital murder charge,
defense counsel’s primary and perhaps only mission is to avoid the death
sentence. To suggest that counsel would act unreasonably if she failed to
advise her client about the immigration consequences is illogical.
b.

The Sex Crime Scenario

Would an attorney fail the performance prong if she failed to investigate
and advise her client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea to a
sexual assault which results in no jail time? Under the Paredez standard, an
attorney, regardless of the specific facts of the case, would act unreasonably if
she did not advise her client.197 Under the author’s proposed standard, the
answer depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
If the state’s case is strong and there is a likelihood of conviction at trial
for forcible rape,198 which may result in a life sentence,199 the attorney’s
decision not to investigate the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to
sexual assault, which may result in no jail time,200 is not unreasonable because
her main concern is to avoid life imprisonment.
However, if the state’s case is weak and there may be a possibility of
entering a plea to a lesser charge such as sexual misconduct,201 the attorney
196. Id. at 689.
197. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004).
198. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030 (2000) (“A person commits the crime of forcible
rape if such person has sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion.
Forcible compulsion includes the use of a substance administered without a victim’s knowledge
or consent which renders the victim physically or mentally impaired so as to be incapable of
making an informed consent to sexual intercourse.”).
199. Id. The penalty for forcible rape ranges from five years to life. Id.
200. See, e.g., § 566.040 (2000) (“A person commits the crime of sexual assault if he has
sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person’s consent.”).
The penalty for sexual assault, a class C felony, may be up to seven years. § 558.011.1(3) (2000
& Sup. 2005). Unlike forcible rape, there is no minimum so conceivably the defendant could
receive no jail time.
201. See, e.g., § 566.093.1(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (“A person commits the crime of sexual
misconduct in the second degree if such person: exposes his or her genitals under circumstances
in which he or she knows that such conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.”). The penalty for
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may be acting unreasonably. Even if the sexual assault conviction avoids
prison time, it would lead to the alien’s deportation202 whereas a plea to sexual
misconduct, even if the alien serves actual prison time, could avoid
deportation.203 For an alien in this situation, the attorney’s decision not to
investigate the possibility of deportation would be unreasonable.
c.

The Drug Offense Scenario

Did the attorney in the example described in the introduction fail the
performance prong when she failed to investigate and advise her client about
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea? Under both the Paredez and
the author’s standards, she did. The youth in the introduction bargained for a
conviction that resulted in no jail time but received a surprise additional term:
deportation.204 Had his attorney informed him that a guilty plea to this charge
would lead to deportation, he might have attempted to work out another
bargain where he pled guilty to possession of thirty grams of marijuana, served
actual prison time, and avoided deportation.205
In each of the above scenarios, the author’s proposed standard reaches the
same conclusion as the Paredez standard: an attorney provides ineffective
assistance of counsel when she fails to tell her client about the immigration
consequences if they matter. But only the author’s approach satisfies
Strickland’s case-by-case analysis by allowing attorneys to use their judgment
about how to best represent their clients.
CONCLUSION
Despite the changes that AEDPA and IIRIRA made to immigration law,
deportation continues to be a collateral consequence of conviction. As such,
courts are relieved of any obligation to inform alien defendants that a guilty
plea may or will result in removal. The collateral consequences doctrine,
however, is inconsistent with the case-sensitive rule established in Strickland v.

sexual misconduct, a class B misdemeanor, shall not exceed six months. § 558.011.1(6) (2000 &
Supp. 2005).
202. For immigration purposes, sexual assault is the equivalent of rape. In re Haravasu Fifta,
No. A90-001-497, 2005 WL 649147 (BIA Jan. 18, 2005) unpublished decision. Rape is a
deportable crime of moral turpitude if committed within five years of admission and a sentence of
one year may be imposed. KURZBAN, supra note 25, at 54, 120.
203. Even if sexual misconduct qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, the alien
would qualify for the “petty exception” because the maximum sentence is six months. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 558.011.1(6), 566.093 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
Missouri’s definition of sexual misconduct would not qualify as an aggravated felony either. §§
558.011.1(6) (2000 & Supp. 2005), 566.093 (2000); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2000).
204. See supra notes 2−8 and accompanying text.
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
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Washington. The alternative rule, suggested by most commentators and
adopted in State v. Paredez, that an attorney’s failure to advise her client about
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is categorically unreasonable, is
equally inconsistent with the case-by-case analysis required by Strickland.
Instead, when analyzing Strickland’s performance prong, courts should
conclude that an attorney acts unreasonably when she fails to advise her client
only where the possibility of deportation could have played any part in a
defendant’s decision to plead guilty or go to trial. The prejudice prong should
remain unchanged: the defendant must show that but for the attorney’s act or
omission, he would not have pled guilty.
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